Cryptographic attacks on AES based on side-channel information
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.20535/tacs.2664-29132025.3.344995Abstract
The topic of this work is the refinement of side-channel attacks, using the AES cipher as an example.
Most such attacks are based on statistical methods and physical measurements of side-channel infor-
mation, which is why the key obtained as a result of the attack may contain errors. The goal of this
work is to investigate error correction algorithms for the key found during the attack. In the course of
the work, two cryptographic models and attack algorithms on them are considered. The probability of
success and the complexity of the attacks are theoretically derived and calculated.
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